KONFLIK KEAGENAN: HUBUNGAN SIMULTAN KEPEMILIKAN MANAJERIAL, KEBIJAKAN UTANG, DAN KEBIJAKAN DIVIDEN
Prodi Manajemen Fakultas Ekonomi Universitas PGRI Yogyakarta
Jl. PGRI No.117 Sonosewu, Yogyakarta 55182, Indonesia.
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The main purpose of this research was to determine the agency theory in Indonesia capital market. The variable of agency conflict was represented by asset utility variable, while controlling the agency conflicts mechanism was represented by the managerial ownership, leverage, and dividend. The secondary data used in this research was drawn from the Indonesia Capital Market Directory (ICMD) and Blommberg. The sample data were limited at the manufacture companies and non-financial services, and they were listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (BEI). The research method approach used was quantitative method. The time period of the data was year to year from 2000 to 2011. The instrument of analysis was seemingly unrelated regression (SUR), with panel data and simultaneous model regression techniques. The result of this research was that the managerial ownership had a positive and significant effect on performance. Debt policy had a positive effect but not significant to performance, so 1b hypothesis was not accepted. Dividend policy had a positive and significant effect on performance. Simultaneously there was a substitution and interdependence relationship between the managerial ownership and debt policy. The relationship between two variables namely the managerial ownership and dividend policy could not be concluded.
Keywords: agency conflict, dividend, leverage, managerial ownership, Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR)