DEWAN KOMISARIS DAN TRANSPARANSI:
TEORI KEAGENAN ATAU TEORI STEWARDSHIP?
Fakultas Ekonomika dan Bisnis Universitas Diponegoro
Jl. Erlangga Tengah No.17 Semarang, 50241
Korespondensi dengan Penulis:
Tarmizi Achmad: Telp. +62 24 845 2269, Fax. +62 24 864 57602
This paper examined the impact of the board of commissioners on voluntary disclosures provided by listed firms in Indonesia for the period of year 2004 to 2010. The board of commissioners were characterized by board composition, board size, board role and board intensity. Voluntary disclosure was proximate by an aggregated disclosure score of non-mandatory, non-financial and financial information. The results indicated that board size, board intensity (number of board meetings), or board role (number of audit committe members) was significantly and positively related to the extent of voluntary disclosure as predicted by the agency theory, while board composition (number of insiders) was significantly and negatively related to the extent of voluntary disclosure as predicted by the stewardship theory. The result showed that independent board members did not conduct their monitoring function on management effectively. Alternatively, insiders were involved in operating firm’s activities. This phenomena might be because most firms were owned by family that tended to appoint the board and management team based on the family ties. Hence, using the stewardship theory was more appropriate to analyze the board’s composition than that of using the agency theory.
Key words: voluntary disclosure, board of commissioners, agency theory, stewardship theory, corporate governance